COMMENTS

Enforcing State Domestic Relations
Decrees in Federal Courts
Federal courts have traditionally refused to hear diversity
cases that fall under the heading of domestic relations.1 This exception to diversity jurisdiction has its roots in nineteenth-century
decisions that held that federal courts would not make original
grants of divorce, separation, alimony, or support.2 In this century
the exception has grown unevenly. While the nineteenth-century
cases support at most the claim that federal courts will not make
original grants,3 some federal courts have in recent years refused to
enforce state decrees of alimony,4 support,5 and custody.' Other
7
courts have questioned the very existence of the exception.
The aim of this comment is to investigate the power of federal
Little has been written about the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. For examples of this scarce literature, see Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the
Diversity Jurisdictionof Federal Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 1, 23-36 (1956); Note, Federal
Jurisdictionof "Domestic Relations" Cases, 7 J. FAM. L. 309 (1967); 7 RuT.-CAm. L.J. 593
(1976). For a general background, see also P. BATOR, P. MISHKaN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WEcHsLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1189-92 (2d ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, 13
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3609 (1975). Note, The Domestic Relations Exception
to Diversity Jurisdiction,83 COLUM. L. REv. 1824 (1983), which was published while the
present article was in press, would deny federal jurisdiction in most divorce and in all custody cases.
2 Most courts that have addressed the problem have spoken of a lack of jurisdiction,
traceable perhaps to limits on the jurisdiction of English courts of equity at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. See Vestal & Foster, supra note 1, at 28-31. Other courts have
spoken instead of a doctrine of abstention. See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 811-12
(E.D.N.Y. 1968). For a critical discussion of the historical account, see Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694
F.2d 489, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1982); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490
F.2d 509, 512-14 (2d Cir. 1973); Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 802-09.
" See infra notes 12-33 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1960).
5 See, e.g., Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 782
(1947).
6 See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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courts to enforce state decrees. 8 The power of federal courts to
make original grants, though not indefensible, is not at issue here.
In general, federal courts have been reluctant to enforce alimony,
custody, and support decrees. The main reason for this reluctance
has been a desire to avoid complicated investigations into domestic
conditions. Such investigations are said to intrude on state interests and to exceed the fact-finding capacity of federal courts. 9
No court has articulated the connection between the enforcement of state decrees and the investigations they are said to entail.
The essential link appears to be the modifiability of most decrees.
A federal court that modified a state decree when enforcing it
would indeed be required to make the same detailed investigations
involved in an original decree. Thus, where enforcement is inextricably bound up with a decree's modification, federal courts should
refuse jurisdiction. Where enforcement without modification is
possible, however, federal courts should entertain actions to enforce state decrees. Where jurisdiction is correctly declined, it will
be for reasons of due process and federalism, but this comment
will argue that those considerations apply only in certain well-defined areas and that, for the most part, it is within the competence
of the federal courts to enforce state decrees of alimony, support,
and custody. The comment will also argue that the recent trend
toward enforcement of custody decrees through large tort awards is
inefficient and that in any event damage awards are only justified
in cases in which direct enforcement would be justified as well.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCEPTION

The beginnings of the domestic relations exception lie in a
8

The comment does not consider whether there ought to be such a thing as diversity

jurisdiction; it assumes that federal courts will continue to entertain diversity cases and
attempts to set out the scope of a principled exception to that jurisdiction in cases involving
domestic relations. On the question of the reasonableness of diversity jurisdiction, see H.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 139-52 (1973).

The reasoning criticized here is similar to that used by Judge Learned Hand to uphold the penal and tax exceptions to full faith and credit. (1) a state will not enforce liabilities arising in another state if they conflict with its own public policy, and thus enforcement
presupposes scrutiny of the liability; (2) but scrutiny may commit the domestic state to a

position that would embarrass its neighbor; hence (3) no enforcement of sister state tax or
penal judgments. See Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring), aff'd, 281 U.S. 18 (1930). Here again the crucial step is the first one; it is not clear
why absence of scrutiny should bar enforcement. See Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 232, 282 S.W.2d 150, 151 (1955) ("In our opinion the oft-

repeated dogma, that one sovereign does not enforce the revenue laws of another, is rapidly
approaching a deserved extinction ....

).
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group of nineteenth-century cases concerning jurisdiction over the
enforcement of custody and alimony decrees. These cases
culminate in In re Burrus,10 the case most often cited for the
proposition that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over domestic relations.1 1 A careful reading of these cases will show how
little support they give to the current broad interpretation of the
exception.
A.

Early Cases

In the nineteenth century a number of suits were brought in
federal courts by distraught parents seeking by means of a writ of
habeas corpus to get the question of the custody of a child before
the courts. In a number of the earlier cases there was no state custody decree to be enforced, and the federal courts divided on the
extent of their authority to make original grants of custody. While
one court declared that there was such authority, 12 others declined
jurisdiction because of a failure of amount in controversy, saying
that either the writ or the custody itself lacked monetary value.13
Still another held that while the disposition of custody is a common-law power of the sovereign, the federal courts have "no...
. . which can be exercised without aucommon law prerogatives.
14
thority of . . . law."
The issue of enforcement of custody decrees already granted
by a state finally arose in Bennett v. Bennett. 5 Since the court was
being asked to enforce an existing decree, it did not need to consider whether it had the authority to award custody. The court
founded jurisdiction upon diversity and, as to the amount in con10 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
" See, e.g., Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir. 1967).
" See United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256) ("When
...the court is asked to lend its aid to put the infant into the custody of the father, and to
withdraw him from other persons, it will look into all the circumstances, and ascertain
whether it be for the real, permanent interests of the infant . . . ."). There was no real
holding in this case, since the outcome was a settlement approved by the court. Id. at 32.
Is See, e.g., Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 120 (1847) (not sufficiently determinable amount in controversy to bring the matter before the Supreme Court on appeal; the
Court did not decide whether the lower court had jurisdiction); Ex parte Everts, 8 F. Cas.
909, 914 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1858) (No. 4581) (diversity jurisdiction does not include proceedings
by habeas corpus "for the plain reason, if there were no other, that the matter in controversy has no pecuniary value, and can not be estimated in money"). The Court in Barry said
that the matter of custody "rises superior to money considerations." 46 U.S. (5 How.) at
120.
" In re Barry, 42 F. 113, 119 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844).
15 3 F. Cas. 212 (D.C.D. Or. 1867) (No. 1318) [hereinafter cited as Bennett 1].
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troversy, held that custody satisfied that requirement.'"
The most important early case cited for the rule that federal
courts should stay out of domestic controversies is Barber v. Barber. 7 The plaintiff in Barber had obtained a judgment in the New
York Court of Chancery against the defendant for the payment of
alimony 8 and sued in the United States District Court for the District of Wisconsin to enforce the prior judgment. 19 On the defendant's appeal, the Supreme Court first set the stage with the following dictum:
Our first remark is-and we wish it to be remembered-that this is not a suit asking the court for the allowance of alimony. That has been done by a court of competent
jurisdiction....
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of
the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce ....
"
The court went on to hold that the district court acting as a court
of equity had subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the New York
alimony judgment.2 1 Nonetheless, the disclaimer of jurisdiction to
decree divorce or grant alimony has, despite the holding, become
the fountainhead of the general domestic relations exception.22
6 The

court stated:

If it was thought proper and right by the framers of the constitution and congress [sic]
to give the national courts jurisdiction of a controversy between citizens of different
states, where the matter in dispute is mere rights of property-to be measured by mere
dollars and cents-why should their jurisdiction not extend to the more important controversy like this, where the matter in dispute is the custody and control of an infant
child of the parties.
Id. at 220.
Bennett I was the last major case on custody prior to the Supreme Court ruling in
Burrus. There was, however, an annotation on habeas corpus appended to In re Brosnahan,
18 F. 62, 74-75 (C.C.W.D. Miss. 1883), in which the author, conceding an apparent split in
the courts on this matter, argued against jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in
custody cases solely on the ground that there was no amount in controversy, as required by
diversity jurisdiction. He did not distinguish custody cases based on state decrees from attempts to have original determinations of custody made in the federal courts.
17 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
18 Id. at 584-85.
19 Id.
at 583-84.
20 Id. at 584.
21 Id. at 588, 591-92.
See, e.g., Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 800-803 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). A later case,
Terry v. Sharon, 131 U.S. 40 (1889), also took jurisdiction in a case involving domestic relations. The Terry Court was required to decide whether the United States Circuit Court for
the Northern District of California had jurisdiction to void a written declaration of marriage
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B. In re Burrus
Prior to Burrus, although the lower federal courts divided over
jurisdiction of original custody decrees, both the lower courts and
the Supreme Court enforced existing state decrees of custody and
alimony. Burrus is cited for the first actual holding of the domestic
relations exception (which appeared as dictum in Barber),23 and
for the extension of that doctrine to custody cases.24 Neither can
be found in the opinion.
In Burrus, the effect of a domestic relations exception on custody cases was considered but not decided. A careful reading of the
case reveals that the opinion has little to do with the position that
later courts have read into it. Although the Court did say that any
question of domestic relations belonged to state, not federal, law,25
the court intended by the statement to indicate the limits of federal legislative power, not the limits of the jurisdiction of federal
courts.
The petitioner, T.F. Burrus, was being held in prison for contempt by order of the United States District Court for the District
of Nebraska, having abducted his grandchild after turning her over
to her father upon the district court's order. The district court had
considered the question of its own jurisdiction and had decided
that question in the affirmative.2 8 In its own consideration of the
lower court's jurisdiction, the Supreme Court pointed out that jurisdiction in federal courts must have some specific basis.2 First,
the Court ruled out any constitutional question as a basis for jurisdiction, since there was no evidence that in the grandfather's care
the child was deprived of any liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.2 8 The Court then ruled out any infraction of a federal statute:
"[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the
laws of the United States. 219 Turning to the diversity basis for jubetween the defendant and the plaintiff's decedent. On appeal the defendant argued, citing
Barber, id. at 42, that the suit to cancel the declaration was but "an attempt, by slightly
disguised indirection, to accomplish a divorce which the court recognized it had no power to
accomplish directly." Id. at 44. The Court held that the circuit court could hear the suit,
since "the object of the suit, the cancellation of a forged instrument, is one of the common
heads of equity jurisdiction." Id. at 48.
23 See 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 584.
U See, e.g, Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir. 1967).
25136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
26Id. at 588.
17 Id.
at 591.
28 Id. at 593.
29Id. at 593-94. Thus what is intended to be ruled out by these words is not jurisdic-
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risdiction, which the opinion is sometimes said to have decided,3 0
the Court stated:
[W]hether the diverse citizenship of parties contesting this
right to the custody of the child could, in the courts of the
United States, give jurisdiction to those courts to determine
that question, has never been decided by this Court that we
are aware of. Nor is it necessary to decide it in this case, for
the order . . . is not a judgment of the Circuit Court of the
United States, but a judgment of the District Court of the
same District . . . [and] the District Courts of the United
States have not jurisdiction by reason of the citizenship of the
parties.3 1
Thus, in the absence of any federal question, "the. . .proceeding
before the . . .District Court was coram non judice .... "31
Concerning a number of crucial issues, the holding in Burrus
evidently says nothing. The Court did not address the difference,
for jurisdictional purposes, between original grants of custody and
the enforcement of state grants; there was no state decree in the
case before it. And the question whether there is a domestic relations exception, and whether it extends to custody, is precisely the
question the Court found it unnecessary to decide. 3
C.

Twentieth-Century Developments

Despite the meagerness of the exception under nineteenthcentury precedent, and despite the lack of any precedent for including suits seeking to enforce state decrees in the exception, the
exception has grown in the twentieth century. The principles that
have guided development of the exception in the area of enforcement are difficult to discern. In some of the cases in which enforcement of alimony and support decrees have been at issue, federal

tion of federal courts over domestic relations cases, but rather the power of the federal
legislature to legislate in these matters.
30 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930).
3' 136 U.S. at 596 (emphasis added). Though most of the nineteenth-century federal

district courts did not have diversity jurisdiction, in Bennett I and Barber the district
courts did. See Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76, 78. The United States District

Courts for the District of Oregon and the District of Wisconsin, like the United States District Court for the District of Kentucky under the original Judiciary Act of 1789, id. § 10, 1
Stat. 73, 77, had many of the prerogatives of federal circuit courts, including diversity
jurisdiction.
32 136 U.S. at 597.
33 See HART & WEcHsLER, supra note 1, at 1189.
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courts have found jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit, for example,
has twice ordered lower courts to enforce state decrees.3 5 On the
other hand, some federal courts have refused to enforce alimony
and support decrees. 36 And in spite of Bennett I, federal courts
have almost uniformly refused to enforce custody and visitation
7
decrees.

Perhaps the most significant development has been in a line of
recent cases in which plaintiffs sought both enforcement of a custody decree and damages in tort for the abduction of the child.38 In
a 1973 case, the Sixth Circuit denied that it had jurisdiction over
either claim,39 and in 1981, the First Circuit abstained from taking
jurisdiction in a similar case. 0 In 1982, however, the District of
Columbia and Seventh Circuits divided the claims in similar suits.
Both granted the jurisdiction of the district court to award damages, but the District of Columbia Circuit refused to enforce the
custody decree by injunction, 41 and the Seventh Circuit intimated

that the district court was without jurisdiction to levy continuing
punitive damages for the continuance of the tort.42
II. POLICIEs

AFFECTING THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MODIFIABLE DECREES

Despite the weakness of the nineteenth-century precedents,43
federal courts justify the present vitality of the domestic relations
exception with a number of policy considerations. In Crouch v.
See, e.g., Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981); Keating v. Keating, 542
F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1976); Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
896 (1954).
" See Keating, 542 F.2d at 912; Harrison,214 F.2d at 573. Modification was left to the
state court that issued the original decree, "'such change to be thereafter adopted by this
Court.'" Id. at 573 (quoting district court's decree).
" See, e.g., Gonzales v. Gonzales, 83 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
37 See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffier, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Bennett,
682 F.2d
1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Bennett Il] (unrelated to Bennett I of 1867);
Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967); Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88 (D.
Md. 1977); Gill v. Gill, 412 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 568 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1978).
E.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982), cited with approval in
Bennett II, 682 F.2d at 1042.
31 See Gargallo v. Gargallo, 472 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
805 (1973).
40 See Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[A]Ithough the exception has
been narrowly confined, we, and other courts of appeals, have held that federal courts
should abstain from adjudicating claims that are closely related to, though not within, the
jurisdictional exception." (citations omitted)).
41 See Bennett II, 682 F.2d at 1040-41.
12 See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d at 494 (dictum).
43 See supra notes 10-33 and accompanying text.
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Crouch," for example, these considerations are summarized:
The reasons for federal abstention in these cases are apparent:
the strong state interest in domestic relations matters, the
competence of state courts in settling family disputes, the
possibility of incompatible federal and state court decrees in
cases of continuing judicial supervision of the state, and the
problem of congested dockets in federal courts.45
These four considerations are not equally relevant to the justification of the exception. The problem of congested dockets, for example, may be pressing, and may even be a reason for eliminating
diversity jurisdiction entirely. 40 It is not by itself a justification for
cutting back in any particular area. Crowded dockets provide no
more than an additional reason to remove an area from diversity
jurisdiction if it can be excluded on other grounds. And where
there is a genuine possibility of incompatible results, the federal
courts may abstain from consideration of the particular case, in
domestic relations as in any other area.47
While special competence and interest are more directly relevant to the domestic relations exception in particular, the connection between these considerations and the jurisdiction of federal
courts is not self-evident. Conceding state interest in making the
original grants, it must surely be in the state's interest to have the
grant enforced in other courts. 48 And even granting the lack of

competence of federal courts to make detailed investigations of domestic conditions, it still remains to be shown that such investigations are necessary to the enforcement of decrees.
The connection between enforcement and state interests on
the one hand and enforcement and competence to carry out investigations on the other depend upon the modifiability of state decrees. It is not enforcement that infringes on state interest; it is
44

566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978).

45 Id. at 487 (citations omitted). See also Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d at 492 (7th Cir.

1982) (federal courts not competent to handle domestic relations cases); Buechold v. Ortiz,
401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968) (lack of competence, state interest, comity); Cherry v.
Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977) (lack of competence, state interest); Thrower v.
Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976) (workload, state interest); Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 395 F. Supp. 719, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (lack of competence).
" See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, supra note 8, at 3 ("[T]he inferior federal courts, and indeed
the Supreme Court as well, are faced with the prospect of a breakdown. ..
ITihe inferior
courts now have more work than they can properly do .
").
47 See cases cited supra note 2. See generally Vestal & Foster, supra note 1.
4S This is the import of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 111
(1979) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as U.C.C.J.A.]; see infra text following note
101.
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modification. Modification of an existing decree is as much of an
intrusion into areas of state interest as the original grant of a decree would be. If federal courts cannot make an original grant, they
cannot replace an existing decree with a new one. And it is modification, not mere enforcement, that calls for detailed investigations.
What underlies the two policy considerations is a perceived connection between enforcement and modification: where there is enforcement there must be a hearing-or the possibility of a hearing-on modification.49 Modification intrudes on state interests in
domestic relations and requires investigations, and investigations
call into question the fact-finding competence of federal courts.
The courts that have refused enforcement have not articulated
the connection between enforcement and modification very carefully. Where a modifiable decree granting alimony, support, or custody of a child may be enforced in whole or in part without
prejudice to a party's right under the decree to seek modification
by a state court, federal courts should have jurisdiction to enforce
it. The limits beyond which a modifiable decree may not be enforced without prejudice to its modifiability are set by the two concerns of due process and federalism. Granting that the federal
courts do not have the resources to make detailed investigations of
domestic conditions, and hence are incompetent to modify state
domestic relations decrees, a federal enforcement decree that
prejudices the right of a party to a hearing on the modifiability of
the original decree violates that party's right to due process under
Griffin v. Griffin. 0 Similarly, where enforcement affects
modifiability, the federal courts have altered the substantive rights
of the parties under state law, contrary to Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins.5

The remainder of this comment will examine the limits set by
due process and federalism on the enforcement of variously modifiable state decrees in federal courts, treating first awards of alimony
and support and then custody decrees. It will conclude that only
comparatively rare instances require the federal courts to deny jurisdiction over enforcement actions.
49 See Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d
Cir. 1973) ("We have upheld federal jurisdiction in a[n] ... action to determine whether a
Connecticut divorce decree was invalid... [and] in a[n] . . . action to declare a Mexican
divorce invalid ....
[But a] different view has been taken where the amounts ordered to be
paid as alimony were subject to modification ..... The court clearly assumes that enforcement might entail modification in such cases.).
50 327 U.S. 220, 228 (1946). See infra text accompanying notes 53-74.
51 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See infra text accompanying notes 74-80.
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III. MODIFIABILITY, DuE PROCESS, AND FEDERALISM

Decrees awarding alimony or support vary in their degree of
modifiability. A decree may not be modifiable at all; it may be prospectively modifiable; it may be both prospectively and retrospectively modifiable. If it is not modifiable at all, then the amount due
at each interval will be fixed, and there will be no way to change
any feature of the decree. If a decree is prospectively modifiable
only, then the terms of the decree can be changed, but the changes
will apply to future installments only. A decree that is retrospectively modifiable can be changed even with respect to payments
that have already come due.2 In addition a decree may or may not
have been reduced to judgment in the state that granted it, further
complicating the decree's procedural posture. The following sections will explore the implications of due process and federalism
for each of these various procedural permutations.
A. Federal Enforcement and Due Process
1. Griffin v. Griffin and Modifiable Decrees. To enforce a modifiable decree without allowing the defendant to be heard on the
issue of modification may be a denial of due process under a line of
Supreme Court cases arising under the full faith and credit clause5 s
and culminating in Griffin v. Griffin." These cases concern suits to
enforce alimony and support decrees in courts of states other than
those granting the original decrees, rather than in federal courts, as
55 Lynde v. Lynde,56 the first such case, concerned a
in Barber.
52 For an example of a court treating a decree as retrospectively modifiable under state

law, see Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901). In Lynde, no alimony had been requested

with the divorce decree. Later, after the husband had remarried, the wife asked the court to
change the decree retrospectively to include alimony. The court complied, and the husband
found himself with a liquidated obligation for all payments that would have accrued from
the time of the original decree to the time of the modified decree.
53 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) provides that the
records and judicial proceedings of any court of any. . . State, Territory or Possession
...or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory, or Possession from which they
are taken.
- 327 U.S. 220, 228 (1946). See also Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir.
1967) (noting that "if the original judgment is subject to modification, the demands of full
faith and credit may be satisfied whether or not the terms of the original decree are
obeyed").
55 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859). See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
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past-due alimony claim that was divisible into two parts; one
amount had been reduced to judgment in the granting state, and
the other amount, having accrued since the time of judgment, had
not. 57 The Court held that enforcement of a claim for the former
amount was required in the sister state, but enforcement of a claim
for the latter amount was not. 8 This decision seemed to conflict
with Barber, where installments that were past due but not reduced to judgment were held enforceable by the federal court.59
Under the Barber holding, the second claim in Lynde should have
been enforceable.
In Sistare v. Sistare ° the Court undertook to reconcile the
two rulings. It said that the Lynde court had believed, perhaps
mistakenly, that in New Jersey past-due payments reduced to
judgment were not retrospectively modifiable, but that past-due
payments not reduced to judgment were always retrospectively
modifiable."' The Sistare Court interpreted Lynde as holding that
if past-due amounts can be modified or recalled retrospectively
under the law of the granting state, then sister states need not enforce the payment of those amounts under the full faith and credit
clause. 2
Barber, Lynde, and Sistare all discussed situations where a
court need not enforce a decree of a foreign state court. In Griffin
the Court addressed the question of when a court must not enforce
such a decree. It held that if modifiable past-due obligations are
enforced in any court, failure to give the defendant the opportunity he would be given in the first state to litigate the issue of
modification is a denial of due process."'
This holding restricts the obligations that may be enforced in
foreign courts. If a court, for whatever reason, cannot allow litigation of the issue of modification, no judgment that remains modifiable may be enforced. Conversely, where a judgment is no longer
modifiable, Griffin presents no obstacle to enforcement. For example, a court may enforce claims for past-due payments under a ret&6181 U.S. 183 (1901).
'7 Id. at 187.
See id.
" See 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 590-91 (1859) ("[C]ourts of equity will interfere to compel
the payment of alimony ....
The interference, however, is limited to cases in which alimony has been decreed; then only to the extent of what is due .
.
" 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
41 Id. at 16, 17.
42

Id.

's 327 U.S. at 228. Griffin involved a retrospectively modifiable decree; the past-due
payments were still modifiable. Id. at 226.
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rospectively modifiable decree if they are already reduced to a nonmodifiable judgment, or enforce a decree that was originally nonmodifiable. Payments under a prospectively modifiable decree that
are past due are also no longer modifiable by any court. Thus if a
claim for the amount due is enforced, the defendant cannot argue
that the court's judgment concerns an amount he still has the right
to modify. Where a decree is retrospectively modifiable, enforcement of past-due payments will involve amounts that the defendant retains the right to change, and enforcement without a hearing on modification is a denial of due process; where the decree is
prospectively modifiable, there is no analogous right, and no corresponding denial of due process, if the defendant is denied a hearing on modification of past-due amounts."'
2. Enforcement of Future Payments Under Prospectively
Modifiable Decrees. In 1954 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the order
of a district court enforcing both past-due and future installments
under a decree that could only be modified prospectively.65 The
district court had left modification to the state court, "such change
67
thereafter to be adopted by this Court." 6 In Keating v. Keating,
the Fourth Circuit reversed the ruling of a district court to the
effect that, although it had the power to enforce claims for prospective payments, it had no obligation to do so. 6 8 These holdings
stand for the proposition that present enforcement even of prospectively modifiable future obligations may, in some circumstances, not be denial of due process, even though litigation of
modification is not possible.6 9
Whether or not enforcement by federal courts of future payments under prospectively modifiable decrees violates the payor's
due-process right to a hearing depends on the method of enforcement used. Enforcement of such claims can take one of two general
forms. First, a court can levy a bond to guarantee future payments. 70 By means of the bond, the court requires the defendant to
" Itmay be argued that even when a retrospectively modifiable decree is enforced by a
federal court, the defendant could protect his rights in a subsequent modification hearing in
the state court. Evidently that did not impress the Griffin court as sufficient protection.
"I See Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954).
66Id. at 573.
67 542 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 911-12.
" See also Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1960) (decrees that are retrospectively modifiable will not be enforced, but those that are not will be). But see Walker v.
Walker, 509 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Va. 1981) (alimony decree is not enforceable in federal court
when it is for an indefinite period and increasing amount).
70 This remedy was sought by the plaintiff and awarded by the trial court in Lynde, 181
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guarantee payment of a sum that he retains the right to modify
under state law. Under the analysis set forth in Griffin,7 1 enforcement of future payments by bond violates the defendant's due process right to a modification hearing.
The second form of enforcement of claims for future payments
is to enjoin the defendant to pay them, subject to punishment for
contempt of court on failure to pay. 72 Strictly speaking, the court is
not by use of an injunction enforcing claims for future amounts
that the defendant still has the right to modify; the injunction's
sanction does not take effect for any particular payment until it
becomes due, at which time the defendant loses his right to seek
modification under a prospectively modifiable decree." At any
time it remains open to the defendant to initiate modification
hearings in state courts for subsequent payments. Because enforcement by injunction does not levy a federal sanction against a defendant until a payment is no longer modifiable, it does not run
afoul of the defendant's due process right under Griffin.
B.

Federalism

Erie and considerations of federalism yield precisely the same
results. 4 Federal courts are limited, under Erie, in the ways in
which they can apply state law. According to one statement of the
doctrine:
[i]n all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the
outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court."
In other words, federal judges applying state law should act as the
U.S. at 183-85.
7'1 See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
7' See, e.g., Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571, 573-74 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
896 (1954).
73 This conclusion assumes that enforcement in federal court would be made subject to
modification in state court, as in Keating.
74 For a discussion of the view that the Erie doctrine is the federal version of due process restrictions on a state's conflict of law choices, see D. CURaRE, FEDERAL CouRTs 395 (3d
ed. 1982) ("In short, is not Erie an application of the principle that a disinterested forum
may not frustrate the policies of an interested state?"). See also Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and the State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39 IND. L.J. 228, 238-41 (1964) ("[A] constitutional argument for Erie can be made by analogy to those cases establishing due process
limitations on a state's choice of law.").
7 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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state courts would act. 76 This might suggest that if a defendant can
argue for modification in state court but not in federal court, the
outcome is liable to be substantially different, and hence if modification is not possible in federal courts, enforcement of modifiable
decrees should not be possible either.
It is not always the case, however, that if a defendant can argue for modification in state courts but not in federal courts, the
outcome is likely to be substantially different. For example, when a
court considers both future and past-due payments under a prospectively modifiable decree, enforcement and modification concern fundamentally different issues, even if they are considered in
the same hearing; the outcome on one issue does not affect the outcome on the other. Enforcement will concern only amounts that
have already accrued; modification will concern only future payments. The two amounts are independent and do not overlap.
Since the two results are separable, there is no Erie reason why a
federal court may not consider the former without the latter.
There will be no substantial difference in outcome; a judgment in
federal court as to past-due payments will be no different from the
judgment the defendant would have gotten in state court. Modification will have no effect on the amount adjudged due at the enforcement hearing, and the defendant will still be able to ask for
modification in state court. To deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over the enforcement hearing because they have no jurisdiction over the modification would make no more sense than depriving them of jurisdiction in one action because they had no
jurisdiction in a totally unrelated action simply because state
courts had discretion to join the two in one hearing.
In the case of future enforcement of alimony and support, the
existence of Erie problems, like the existence of due process
problems, depends greatly on the remedy. If the plaintiff has requested a bond, then the scope of the modification hearing and the
scope of the enforcement hearing are the same; the outcome of one
would affect the outcome of the other because modification might
affect the size of the bond, or indeed whether there was any bond
needed at all, given the possibility that the defendant might be
relieved of all future obligation. A federal court that could not hear
a modification plea ought not to hear the enforcement plea.77 But
78 D. CuRRE, supra note 74, at 397. But ef. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d
280 (2d Cir. 1960) (New York federal court applied California law to suit in which New York

state court would have applied South Carolina law).
77

See supra text accompanying notes 54-74.
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if the remedy in question is an injunction with contempt for noncompliance, enforcement will be of each payment as it comes due
and becomes vested. Enforcement by injunction is thus closely
analogous to enforcement of payments past due. 8 Modification
will not affect the outcome of the enforcement hearing, since the
contempt-of-court sanction enforcing payment will not attach until
payments are past-due and hence no longer modifiable.7 9 Where a
federal court enforces future payments under prospectively modifiable decrees with an injunction, the same result follows on both
due process and Erie grounds: the federal court may hold an enforcement hearing without a hearing on modification.
IV.

CUSTODY

In 1982 the United States Courts of Appeals for the District of
Columbia and Seventh Circuits reached similar results in two cases
involving the taking of a child by one parent in violation of a custody decree: Lloyd v. Loeffler 8e and Bennett I1 8 1 In each case, the
federal district court had been asked for damages for past injury
because of the violation82 and forward-looking relief that would
take the form of an injunction against continued deprivation of
custody in one case and continuing punitive damages for the continuing tort in the other. 83 In each case, the court of appeals affirmed the damage award for past injury, but concluded that the
requested forward-looking relief was within the domestic relations
exception."
The policy considerations that bear on the scope of the exception in child custody cases are essentially identical to those relevant to alimony and support decrees. In general, it does not violate
78 1 am assuming as in note 73 that the injunction is made subject to modification in
state courts.
79 A third method of enforcement was used in Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1982), a child custody case: continuing punitive damages. For purposes of the due-process
and federalism analyses of this comment, continuing punitive damages are indistinguishable
from an injunction. See infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
30 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
$1682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
$1694 F.2d at 491; 682 F.2d at 1041.
" 694 F.2d at 491 (punitive damages); 682 F.2d at 1041 (injunction).
See Lloyd, 694 F.2d at 493-94; Bennett II, 682 F.2d at 1040-41. In Bennett II, id. at
1044, in which the injunction was sought, the court ruled that the district court did not have
jurisdiction. In Lloyd, 694 F.2d at 493, the Seventh Circuit held that since the concerned
party was not before the court of appeals to raise the issue of jurisdiction over the continuing damage award it could not decide the issue. Nevertheless, in a lengthy dictum the court
explained that the district court did not have such jurisdiction.
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either principles of federalism or the due process rights of the defendant under Griffin 5 to allow federal courts to enforce state custody decrees. What additional considerations there are pertaining
peculiarly to child custody also militate against a broad exception
to jurisdiction. Finally, the awarding of damages in tort by both
courts, in lieu of direct enforcement by injunction, is inappropriate; due-process and federalism considerations will allow such
damages only where direct enforcement would also be available.
A.

The Enforcement of Custody Decrees

1. Due Process and Federalism.As in the case of alimony and
support, the policies underlying an exception to diversity jurisdiction for suits to enforce custody decrees boil down to two: due process and federalism. 8 The due process issue7 was described by the
8
Second Circuit in Hernstadt v. Hernstadt:
As the decree sought to be enforced is one subject to modification, if appellant were to be permitted to prosecute this suit,
the federal courts would inevitably be entitled to reexamine
the Connecticut decree in the light of whatever changed circumstances might be alleged. In fact a strong argument can be
made to the effect that the wife here would be deprived of due
process of law if a court which assumed jurisdiction over such
a dispute refused to reexamine the merits of the original decree. But it is just this reexamination in custody matters
which is barred from the federal courts by In re Burrus5 8
If jurisdiction without an examination of the merits is a denial
of due process, and if federal courts are prohibited from examining
the merits, then a federal court that took jurisdiction would violate
the parties' due process rights. However, just as the apparent inextricability of enforcement and modification of alimony and support
awards proves on closer examination to be largely illusory,89 so too
may federal courts in most cases enforce custody decrees without
See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
See supra text accompanying notes 43-51.
87 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967).
Id. at 318. In a footnote to this passage, the court cites as "an analogous situation"
the case of Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955). See 373 F.2d at 318
n.1. In Worthley, Justice Traynor's opinion illustrates the dilemma Griffin created for
states, that like California, had undertaken to enforce the decrees of sister states: they must
either try modification on the merits or refuse to enforce. See 44 Cal. 2d at 467-74, 283 P.2d
at 21-25. See also Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941).
89 See supra notes 53-80 and accompanying text.
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violating the defendant's due process right to a modification hearing. Like prospectively modifiable money allowances, custody by
its very nature cannot be modified in retrospect.9 0 Since custody
decrees are by their nature only prospectively modifiable, enforcing
a custody decree does not give the plaintiff something to which his
rights might later be contested and does not deprive the defendant
of any right to contest custody for any future period.
The courts have observed that custody is essentially different
from "mere dollars and cents." ' Nevertheless, enforcing custody
decrees finds an analogy in the enforcement of monetary awards
through injunctions. Neither an injunction nor enforcing custody
gives a parent something to which his or her right might later be
contested. Like an injunction, returning custody to the appropriate
parent does not give that parent an undue advantage in future
modification hearings. If the decree is enforced, the parties are
simply put into the positions they were in before the abduction,
and the defendant may then argue for modification in state court.92
Furthermore, it is the intent of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (U.C.C.J.A.) that, except in unusual cases, states
enforce without modification the modifiable decrees of sister
states.93 Where compassion and concern for the child dictate it,

0 State custody
issued. H.

decrees are in fact always modifiable in the courts in which they were

CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

§ 17.7, at 598

(1968).
" Bennett I, 3 F. Cas. 212, 220 (D.C.D. Or. 1867) (No. 1318).
" Many state courts will not hear a plea for modification until the abducted child is
returned to the proper parent. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Marks, 96 11. App. 3d 360, 420
N.E.2d 1184 (1981); West v. West, 125 11M.App. 2d 251, 261 N.E.2d 31 (1970).
"3See S. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF CHILDREN
89 (1981) (Under the U.C.C.J.A., "[i]f the second state cannot exercise jurisdiction to modify a previous decree, it follows logically that it will enforce the previous decree in a habeas
corpus action and return the child.") According to the Commissioner's Prefatory Note to
U.C.C.J.A., 9 U.L.A. 111, 114 (1979), "[t~he Act is designed to bring some semblance of
order into the existing chaos. It limits custody jurisdiction to the state where the child has
his home or where there are other strong contacts with the child and his family.... It
provides for the recognition and enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees in many instances .... Jurisdiction to modify decrees of other states is limited by giving a jurisdictional preference to the prior court under certain conditions." See also Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980, § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. V 1981):
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms,
and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child
custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court
of another State.
(f)A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child
made by a court of another State, if(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and (2) the
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federal courts can easily accommodate the unusual case by allowing a period, before enforcement, during which an appeal for
modification can be made in state court. 4 So long as enforcement
does not prejudice the defendant's right to a modification hearing,
enforcement does not offend the requirement of due process set
down in Griffin.
The principle of federalism underlying the domestic relations
exception for alimony and support decrees is also invoked in the
custody area in Lloyd v. Loeffler.9 5 That opinion points out the
strong state interest in keeping certain sorts of custody-related
proceedings together."' If there is such an interest in keeping enforcement and modification together, and if Erie requires that federal courts applying state law act as state courts would act, 97 it is
not possible for federal courts to enforce custody decrees if they
are unable to modify them. It is difficult to find a state interest
sufficient to compel federal courts to deny jurisdiction. A decision
by a state to join such hearings cannot be sufficient to exclude federal jurisdiction. If it were, a state could arbitrarily defeat diversity
jurisdiction in any particular area by requiring proceedings in that
area to be joined with proceedings in an area from which the federal courts were legitimately excluded. A state must advance some
justification for wanting the affected actions to be heard together.
One possible justification was raised by the Seventh Circuit in
Lloyd. It implied that considerations of judicial economy were sufficient justification; if the state court had, for reasons of economy,
decided that an action, the tort of abduction of a child, had to be
heard in a proceeding ancillary to a custody proceeding, federal
courts would not have jurisdiction over the tort proceeding.9 ,
In fact there is little support for the assertion of an important
state interest in keeping enforcement and modification together.
The Lloyd opinion itself does not find such an interest in judicial
economy. The U.C.C.J.A. is evidence of a rather strong state interest in the finality of state custody decrees; although the Act does

court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise
such jurisdiction to modify such determination.
9 Such a stay would seem to fall under the proposal in AmERMAN LAW INSTITUTE,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE & FEDEmAL COURTS § 1371(c) (1969)
("A district court may stay an action ... on the ground that the action presents issues of
State law that ought to be determined in a State proceeding .....
:5

694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).

1 See id. at 493.
97 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
98 See 694 F.2d at 493.
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allow modification under some circumstances in sister states, its
intention is clearly to encourage enforcement without modification
and to require the non-custodial parent to seek change in the
courts of the original state whenever possible. 9 Modification becomes possible in a second state only when specified requirements
for jurisdiction have been met,10 0 but enforcement need not wait
upon modification or upon the shift in jurisdiction.101 The
U.C.C.J.A. evinces a preference by the states to have their decrees
enforced uniformly while reserving to themselves the right to modify. Enforcement of custody decrees in federal courts creates no
Erie problems,102 since a federal court that entertained an enforcement action without a hearing on modification would be acting as
any state court would under the U.C.C.J.A.' 0 s
2. The Interest of the Child. In Lloyd v. Loeffler,1° the declaSee S. KATZ, supra note 93, at 4, 5; Commissioner's Prefatory Note to U.C.C.J.A., 9
U.L.A. 111, 113-14 (1979). See also Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency,
102 S. Ct. 3231, 3238 (1982) (speaking of the "exceptional need for finality in child-custody
disputes").
10 U.C.C.J.A. § 8, 9 U.L.A. at 142; § 14, 9 U.L.A. at 153.
101 Section 13 of the Act allows enforcement in sister states even when modification is
not possible. See U.C.C.J.A. § 13, 9 U.L.A. 111, 151 (1979). The adoption of the Act by 45
states, see U.C.C.J.A., 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979) & id. at 15 (Supp. 1983) (table of jurisdictions
that have adopted Act), is the clearest possible evidence that states do not take it to be in
their interest to tie proceedings on enforcement of their 'decrees in foreign courts to proceedings on modification. See U.C.C.J.A. §§ 13, 14, 9 U.L.A. 151-58 (1979); see also Commissioner's Notes to U.C.C.J.A. § 13, 9 U.L.A. 151 (1979) ("This section, and sections 14 and 15
are the key provisions which guarantee a great measure of security and stability of environment to the 'interstate child' by discouraging relitigations in other states."); Annot., 96
A.L.R.3D 968 (1980) (collecting cases on validity of U.C.C.J.A.).
102 Allowing federal courts to enforce custody decrees without a modification hearing
does not run counter to the holding in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Under
Burford, the federal courts are required to abstain from reviewing the decisions of state
agencies where the legislature has expressly given exclusive appellate jurisdiction to state
courts to avoid the confusion of multiple and conflicting review. Id. at 326-27. In the case of
enforcement suits in federal courts, no danger of conflicting review exists, since federal
courts are limited to the issue of enforcement alone. Furthermore, the U.C.C.J.A., adopted
as of January 1, 1983 by 45 states, see supra note 101, expressly belies the grant of exclusive
jurisdiction that is a prerequisite to Burford abstention by providing for enforcement of
custody decrees in foreign states. U.C.C.J.A. § 12, 9 U.L.A. at 149-50; U.C.C.J.A. § 13, 9
U.L.A. at 151; Commissioner's Prefatory Note to U.C.C.J.A., 9 U.L.A. at 113-14.
103 In any event, all concern for the interests of the child, the offending parent, and the
state of the original decree can be easily satisfied by subjecting all enforcement orders issuing from a federal court to a temporary delay during which the offending parent will have
the right to seek modification in a state court. Whereas a refusal to enforce indicates to the
parent guilty of child-snatching that he may not have to take any other action to maintain
custody, thus defeating the purposes of the original decree, a conditional enforcement order
would bring the weight of a federal court to bear in forcing him to decide between returning
the child and seeking a reevaluation of the decree in court.
' 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
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ration that enforcement was outside the jurisdiction of federal
courts seems to have been based neither on due process nor on
Erie considerations, but rather on concern for the welfare of the
child involved. The court was concerned that to enforce an injunction would be "implicitly to answer the question who should have
custody of [the child] today." 10 5 Noting the inability of federal
courts to determine where the child is better off,' it concluded
that to enforce without a hearing on modification would be to
make a decision about custody that is liable to do great harm. 7
On closer examination, concern for the child's welfare points
to the opposite conclusion. To refuse to enforce is also to make a
decision about custody that can affect the child's welfare. From the
point of view of a court ignorant of the circumstances, this decision
is as likely to do harm as the prior one: it leaves the child with the
offending parent. 0 8 Indeed it is probable that harm will be done
more often by leaving the child with the abductor. 0 9 The decree of
the state court is some evidence of this; at one time, at least, a
competent court decided against placing the child with the abducting parent. Certainly circumstances change, but it is arguable that
in most cases they will not have changed sufficiently to make the
abductor the preferable parent. The fact that the defendant chose
to abduct the child rather than sue for modification indicates that
in fact things have not changed; it may also indicate serious instability. Moreover, the child may be forced to lead the life of a fugitive under the shadow of a state decree, even if that decree is not
enforceable." 0 These arguments do not prove that the child will
101Id. at 494.
108 See id. at 492.
107

It is three years since Carol was abducted. She is now four and a half years old. She
probably does not remember her father. No matter how egregiously the McMahans

have behaved, it might be a terrible thing today to wrench Carol from their custody to
return her to her father ....
Id. at 494.
108 In Lloyd, in light of the fact that the child had been with the offending parent most
of her life (a circumstance the court by its own reasoning was not competent to investigate),

there arguably was some chance that the child would be better off with the offending parent.
This is probably the exception that proves the rule.
'09This explains the strong preference of the U.C.C.J.A. for finality of decrees. See
supra note 99 and accompanying text.
110 The plaintiff may well not have any remedy outside the federal court because of the
need to obtain personal jurisdiction over the abductor. In Bennett II, the court conceded
that the plaintiff might not have any other forum. 682 F.2d at 1043. See also Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d at 493 ("[A] Maryland court might not be able to obtain personal jurisdiction
over the Loefflers . .
").
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always be better off with the parent who has legal custody; but if
the child's welfare is the main concern in these cases, then a court
that cannot investigate changing conditions (as federal courts cannot), and thus must act in ignorance of such changes, will further
the child's welfare more often by enforcing existing state custody
decrees than by refusing to enforce them.
Custody decrees should therefore be enforceable in federal
courts. As Judge Edwards said in his dissent to Bennett II, "Enforcement of a valid and final state decree does not require a federal court to inquire into the present best interests of minor children; rather, the federal court need only give effect to the binding
decision of. a state court."1 11
B. Enforcement of Custody Through Damage Awards
Bennett H and Lloyd v. Loeffler 12 are examples of the recent
tendency to try to enforce custody decrees indirectly by getting
large damage awards from the courts. 1 3
The consequences after an abduction of awarding damages but
not enforcing custody are both odd and inefficient. The dissent in
Bennett II, pointing out that a plaintiff could return as often as he
liked for new damage awards but could never get enforcement of
custody, called the result a "child-rental" arrangement. 11 4 As long
as the abducting parent was willing to pay damages, the majority
had no apparent objection to letting the child stay with her. More
frequently, as the dissent noted, the defendant in such a case is
likely to be judgment-proof,'1 5 again rendering damages ineffective.
" 682 F.2d at 1045 (Edwards, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
cases cited supra notes 39-42. The relatively liberal granting of jurisdiction to
award damages in child-custody cases is part of a general, though by no means uniform,
expansion of jurisdiction over tort and contract actions touching on domestic relations. Cf.
Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980) (duty to abstain from malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, arson, and conversion does not arise out of a domestic relationship, even if
its breach had its origin in a domestic quarrel); Oxley v. Sweetland, 94 F.2d 33 (4th Cir.
1938) (federal court has jurisdiction where purpose of suit is not to establish the fact of a
marriage, even if that is an incidental effect); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.
1968) (federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the validity of a marriage contract). But
see Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 782 (1947) (cause of
action appears in the domestic relations section of state laws, hence federal courts have no
jurisdiction); Kilduff v. Kilduff, 473 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (federal courts have no
jurisdiction over cases originating in a domestic quarrel); Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F. Supp.
802 (S.D. Iowa 1951) (no jurisdiction where a judgment might affect the later domestic relations of the parties).
114 682 F.2d at 1045 (Edwards, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
" See
113 See

Id. at 1045 n.2.
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Even if the defendant is neither judgment-proof nor so wealthy as
to make him indifferent to payment of damages, the awarding of a
single lump sum as payment for past damages fails to provide the
defendant with any incentive to return the child, since the amount
owed is independent of the parent's compliance with the court's
order.
Prior to an abduction, the prospect of damages is unlikely to
be a deterrent. This is clearly so if the parent is judgment-proof.
Even if he is not, he may refuse to compare custody of the child
with monetary loss. While a reasonable parent, in a reasonable
mood, might be unwilling to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars
to reacquire custody of a child awarded to the other parent, the
same may not be true of a parent who faces the prospect of damages in that amount for child abduction.
While punitive damages for the continued holding of the child
give the abductor an incentive to return the child, they raise all the
supposed jurisdictional problems of direct enforcement.1 1 6 Continuing punitive damages resemble direct enforcement and are unlike
lump-sum damages in that they implicate the future status of the
child. Punitive damages that continue until the defendant relinquishes the child involve precisely the same intrusion into state
interests in domestic relations and the same abridgement of the
defendant's due process right to a modification hearing as does any
federal enforcement of a prospectively modifiable decree. 11 7 Wherever punitive damages are within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, so is direct enforcement by injunction.
CONCLUSION

The domestic relations exception may be seen as an expression
of the principle that federal jurisdiction does not extend into areas
of strong state interest. Because of this principle, federal courts do
not grant divorces, allowances for alimony or support, or custody.
But where the rights, duties, and obligations have been created by
state courts, federal courts can, in the exercise of their diversity
jurisdiction, enforce them. Where modifiable state decrees are in
question, the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to some
extent by considerations of due process and federalism. There is no
116 See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d at 493-94, where the court declined both to enforce a
state custody decree directly and to award continuing punitive damages on the same
ground: either would require an investigation into domestic circumstances that the federal
couds are incompetent to make.

M See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
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convincing objection, however, to the enforcement of alimony or
support decrees that are not retrospectively modifiable, nor to the
enforcement of state custody awards. The recent practice of enforcement of custody decrees through damage awards, however,
raises genuine problems of due process and federalism, and hence
should be abandoned.
Michael L. Corrado

